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ABSTRACT 
Cyber-clever criminals who are aware of the consequence of using mobile phones during conducting 
crimes often stay away from their phones while involved in crimes. Some of them even change their 
handset and SIM card, subsequently . This article looks into how intentional disassociation (and 
even unintentional non-use) of mobile phone in non-cybercrimes, can become evidential clues of the 
perpetrators' involvement in criminal acts. With the help of a recent judicial episode, this article 
reveals how extremely careful and masterful handling of extensive and voluminous CDRs and tower 
dumps by a cyber-savvy investigating official can unearth evidential clues to locate the perpetrator, 
even when the perpetrator stayed away from his or her mobile phone while committing the crime. 
This is not a typical case study article, but an article to report a rare, live episode in cyber forensics 
which can be procedurally highly informative for cyber investigators and related researchers 
worldwide. 
Keywords: CDR, Call Details Records, Cyber investigation, Crime investigation, tower dump, 
Police, Kerala Police 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In today's world, dominated by the magical 
device of omnipresent mobile phones, criminals 
conducting traditional, non-cybercrimes often 
tend to use mobile phones while committing 
crimes. As a knock-on effect of their phone use, 
they often leave behind different types of 
"footprints" in the form of data in the cyber 
space. 
Accordingly, modern, clever, and dedicated 
investigators of non-cybercrimes often search 
through the cyber space too for the presence of 
such "footprints" and use them as instruments 
to track criminals or even as potential evidence. 
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No wonder then that cyber-clever criminals 
who are aware of the potential danger of using 
mobile phones during conducting crimes stay 
away from their phones while involved in crimes 
and even change their handset and SIM card, 
subsequently. By doing so, they attempt to 
ensure that they do not leave any cyber 
evidence of their presence in the crime scene or 
their criminal act and/ or of their physical 
movement as part of the crime. Needless to say, 
such a cyber-savvy precaution by any criminal 
will normally make his or her phone tracks 
remain 'invisible ' or untraceable to the police, 
and hence will drastically reduce the criminal's 
chance of being suspected, especially when there 
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is absence of human witness and other physical 
evidence. 
Such a crime scenario will surely make the 
job of the cyber investigation expert difficult 
and will demand the use of non-conventional 
approaches in cyber forensics in order to 
identify, trace, and locate the criminal. Hence, 
cyber investigation experts worldwide need to 
be made aware of the possible non-conventional 
approaches to intelligently handle such difficult 
situations. 
With such an objective, this article 
documents a non-conventional way adopted by 
an intelligent cyber investigation expert of the 
Kerala Police in order to identify, trace and 
locate a clever rapist-cum-murderer who had 
conducted the crime without leaving any direct, 
explicit , physical as well as cyber trace. 
2. A CRilVUNAL 
EPISODE AND ITS 
CYBER 
(NON)CONNECTION 
Ironically, intentional disassociation and even 
unintentional non-use of mobile phone does not 
necessarily exempt or exonerate the owner of a 
phone. Indeed, the absence or non-use of a 
phone can itself lead on to evidential clues of his 
or her involvement in criminal acts. Extremely 
careful and masterful handling of extensive and 
voluminous telecom records by the investigating 
team can unearth evidential clues even in such 
situations. Thus, acts of om1ss1on can 
paradoxically lead on to evidence of commission 
in cyber forensics. 
Such an extremely careful evaluation is not 
new in research. Various related theoretical 
studies have already revealed that careful 
evaluation of large telecom call graphs ( with 
rich temporal and geographical labels on their 
edges), generated from massive telecom data, 
can successfully provide crucial information on 
Page 98 
Non-Use of a Mobile Phone During Conducting ... 
various hidden call patterns in the telecom 
networks (Pundit et al, 2008, Phadke et al, 
2013). 
In an actual real-life criminal incident, a 
clever rapist-cum-murderer was recently 
successfully traced by the clever handling of 
massive 8.4 million tower dump data and also 
by unearthing hidden call patterns from this 
massive data by a local police team. This 
perpetrator, who was a migrant labourer with 
no past criminal history and working in south-
western India, had stopped using his mobile 
phone long before conducting the crime and had 
even changed his handset twice and SIM card 
once, after the criminal act. In addition, he had 
made sure that his telephone was only 
minimally used during his travel of about 2500 
miles across the country after conducting the 
crime and then again was never used during the 
subsequent travel of about 2000 miles, both 
within 40 days of committing the crime. 
The role and significance of the cyber 
evidence against the criminal was later crucially 
justified and vindicated since the criminal's 
involvement m the crime was later 
unequivocally established through a DNA 
match and the trial court even gave him the 
death sentence. Section 169 ( titled "Call Data 
Records," pages 208 to 241) of the 410-page 
judgment narrates the way the police cyber 
expert innovatively used the information 
relating to the mobile calls in order to trace, 
locate, and catch the perpetrator. 
Generally, prima facie absence of telephone 
evidence in such cases persuades the 
investigating police team not to pursue the 
cyber part any more. Even so, an apparent lack 
of telephone evidence may not really be a lack 
of evidence and a very dedicated and clever 
cyber-savvy police officer can still derive 
intelligent facts by thoroughly investigating the 
details and the background of the perceived 
absence of telephone evidence. Occasionally, 
such an investigation can be extremely complex 
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and complicated, but for a well-motivated cyber 
expert, that itself can be a provocative push for 
more intense and often challengingly strange 
findings. A reasonably detailed account of the 
approach, procedures and methods used by the 
cyber-savvy police officer in the case mentioned 
above appears to be very relevant for an insight 
into the cyber modus-operandi for such cases. 
3. THE RECENT 
INDIAN STORY OF 
SUCCESSFUL CYBER-
TRACING OF A RAPIST-
MURDERER 
On 28th of April 2016, a 30-year-old woman 
( whose name is not disclosed here as also 
preferred in the judgment) was found brutally 
assaulted and dead at her home on the outskirts 
of the town of Perumbavoor in the Ernakulam 
district of the state of Kerala in South India. 
The police team, which first arrived at the 
crime spot , found that most parts of the dead 
body, especially the genitals, were brutally 
damaged, with bloodstains all over the body, 
that her intestines were pulled out and that the 
dress on the dead body was soaked with blood. 
Subsequently, the police registered a criminal 
case ( Case, 2016) and sent the body for 
postmortem after completing the initial 
formalities. 
In a couple of days, the crime incident 
received national importance and wide public 
attention through the media, for various 
reasons. Firstly, the murdered woman was an 
undergraduate student of law in the prestigious 
Government Law College nearby. Secondly, she 
belonged to a financially-challenged family who 
were housed in a temporary hut on the 
government-owned land nearby the Periyarvally 
irrigation canal. She was staying with her 
mother a casual labourer as her father had 
' 
abandoned the family when she was a child. 
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Thirdly, she belonged to a traditionally under-
privileged Indian ethnic community which 
officially falls in the special protective category 
namely "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes." All these heightened and intensified the 
police attention on the investigation and the 
search for the culprit(s). 
Based on the postmortem report 
(postmortem, 2016), the preliminary and 
traditional police investigation did unearth 
enough evidence to establish rape and murder, 
but there was not enough evidence to identify 
and locate the perpetrator(s). 
The biological forensics experts soon found 
that the DNA of one of the bloodstains found 
on the body did not actually match with the 
victim's DNA (RGCB, 2016) and so, suggested 
that the perpetrator( s) too may have been 
injured and bled during the crime. Accordingly, 
the police re-oriented their course of action to 
locate the person with this DNA. 
However, locating the person with this DNA 
in this thickly populated state was not an easy 
task. The population of this tiny south-western 
Indian state (which is not much larger than 
Maryland in the USA) is 34 million (which is 
almost the same as that of big California) 
(Census, 2011). In addition, the crime spot, 
which is very close to the thickly populated 
Perumbavoor town, was multi-ethnic, housing 
several thousands of migrant laborers of diverse 
Indian communities too. 
All these complex, demographic difficulties 
induced the police to incorporate a few 
necessary scientific cyber procedures also into 
their investigation tactics in order to locate the 
criminal in the strong belief that the criminal 
may have used a mobile phone during the crime. 
This belief was scientifically backed-up by the 
fact that this tiny state had already achieved a 
mobile phone density of 110% of the population 
(TRAI, 2017). 
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Accordingly, from the various telecom 
companies operating in the area of crime, the 
police collected around a huge mass of over 1 
million mobile tower dump data ( or the 
metadata of each communicational activity 
relating to mobile phone of all those present 
under the various mobile towers installed 
around the crime spot) generated during the 
two hours before and the two hours after the 
crime. Further, they scientifically analyzed this 
tower dump data ( obtained in the Microsoft 
Excel format) with the objective of creating a 
list of suspects. However, after systematically 
sieving out and removing all "normal" and 
"innocent" data from this tower dump, they 
failed to locate any suspicious number or any 
susp1c1ous IMEI (International Mobile 
Equipment Identity) code in it. Thus, it became 
almost evident to the police that the suspect 
had not used a mobile phone in connection with 
the crime and that their investigation using 
telecom records would not deliver any more 
fruitful results. 
Strong media publicity (TNIE, 2016) and 
active public attention made the authorities 
decide to take on a more rigorous cyber 
investigation policy, and so the investigation 
team was further strengthened by a police 
officer who, although not qualified in computer 
science, had enjoyed a successful track record 
with his intuitive ( as against, trained) skills to 
analyze around massive 2-3 million telephone 
call-related details to locate criminals in several 
sensitive cases, ranging from political murder to 
anti-national activities. The team thus 
definitely achieved greater cyber-savvy and 
fortification and the modus operandi of the 
newly joined expert is the basis of the 
'something from nothing' cyber evidence 
focused herein. 
This police officer chose to begin his duty 
with the CDR ( Call Details Records for the past 
one year, obtained in the Microsoft Excel 
format) of the mobile number of the victim. By 
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using the pivot table facility of the Microsoft 
Excel, he ranked all the contacts found in it 
according to the total time the victim had spent 
with each of them over phone during the past 
one year. The objective of such a ranking was 
to find if the victim had any telephonic contacts 
with anyone enjoying past criminal history and 
an immoral life style (measured along the 
standards often followed by the well-knit, 
orthodox society of this southern-Indian state of 
Kerala with 100% literacy and close to 110% 
mobile phone density). With this rank-list, the 
field squad of the police investigation team 
proved that no one in the rank-list had any 
criminal-past , that the victim's past life was 
quite normal and that the perpetrator(s) could 
very unlikely to be one from among those 
telephonically communicated with the victim 
during the past one year. 
In addition, this police officer logically 
collected and analyzed a gigantic load of 8.4 
million tower dump data ( also obtained in the 
Microsoft Excel format). This data came from 
the around 15 mobile phone towers installed 5-
6 miles around the crime spot and covering the 
preceding 48 hours and the succeeding 24 hours 
of the incident. The data scientifically 
established that the chance for the criminal to 
have used a mobile phone in connection with the 
crime was very remote. 
Proceeding further, the officer used these 
same 8.4 million tower dump data to list out 
( and also to rank them based on their non-use) 
all the mobile phones which were suspiciously 
silent for hours together before the crime had 
happened. In this rank list (which was also 
prepared using the pivot table facility of the 
Microsoft Excel) , he zeroed-in on a particular 
mobile number which was not in use since 
1:05AM on 27th April 2016, 40 hours before the 
crime had happened. The SIM card relating to 
the number was traced then to its owner, S. K. 
Saharul, a migrant labourer who lived in the 
locality of the crime. However, according to the 
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police records, neither the mobile number nor 
its owner had any past criminal history, and so 
there was no reason for the police to suspect 
him. Even so, for a total confirmatory exclusion 
of this number from the crime, the police officer 
obtained the CDR of this SIM card from the 
telephone service provider and analyzed it. He 
found that there were absolutely no incoming 
and outgoing calls and no text messages during 
the 40 hours before the crime. Surprisingly, 
there was no record of even messages that 
should have been routinely there. This absence 
of messages that should have been routinely and 
unavoidably there, no matter what , raised his 
suspicion as it suggested the owner's intentional 
dissociation of the phone from communicational 
traffic ( as against an unintentional, natural 
silence of the phone). 
Delving further , he noted in the CDR that 
this telephone number ( that means, the SIM 
card) was again made operational four hours 
after the incident ( that means, after remaining 
non-operational for 44 hours) when it was under 
a mobile phone tower installed at the nearby 
Perumbavoor town. However, the mobile 
handset used before the crime was certainly 
different from the mobile handset used after the 
crime as indicated by the difference in the IMEI 
codes found in the meta-details of the calls in 
the CDR. 
Also, from the CDR, it was noted that not 
only was the handset different, but the locations 
too were totally different. In addition, it was 
noteworthy that the subsequent mobile phone 
activities showed locational connections with a 
stretch of railway stations wide apart across the 
country. The final activity from this number 
was an outgoing call made on 2nd May 2016, 
four days after the incident, from Dumdumiya, 
a remote village in the state of Assam which is 
as far as 2500 miles away from the crime spot. 
After this final activity, the SIM card was 
suspected to have been dissociated from 
communicational traffic again as there were no 
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records of delivery of even messages that should 
have been routinely and unavoidably there. 
Altogether, in the above process intended to 
totally exclude this number from crime, the 
police ironically found that there were quite a 
few suggestive factors for its involvement in the 
crime. Firstly, the mobile phone was inactive 40 
hours before the crime and then, until 4 hours 
after the crime. Secondly, there was evidence of 
a sudden change of handset. Thirdly, it 
appeared that the phone has been moving by 
rail thousands of miles across the country 
immediately after the crime had happened. 
Fourthly, during most of this time there were 
periods of long non-use of the phone ( and this 
history and pattern of non-use during this short 
period did not tally with the history and pattern 
of non-use of the phone during the previous one 
year). Finally, the final instance of the use of 
the phone was located to be in the owner's 
native land after which, even messages that 
should have been routinely and unavoidably 
there were also seen to have been undelivered. 
All these strongly suggested an effort to 
disconnect or dissociate oneself from the phone 
and to suddenly move away across the country 
with an attempt to be minimally 
communicating using the phone. So, the owner 
of the number, S. K. Saharul became a suspect 
in this case. 
Further, the whole forensic task became 
more complex when it came out that the 
Saharul had in fact never left the place, and was 
still about and around, but had preferred not to 
entertain any family relationship or friendship 
with anyone in the CDR of his number. Upon 
interrogation, Saharul revealed to the police 
that it was not he, but his friend, by the name 
'Ameer-ul Islam' who had been actually and 
illegally using the SIM card for that long. The 
police had no reason to disbelieve Saharul's 
revelation because Ameer-ul Islam ( who 
belonged to Saharul's home state), was also a 
migrant labourer staying in the town near the 
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crime spot. Moreover, the frequent contacts 
( obtained from the CDR of the SIM card) 
consisted of Ameer-ul-Islam's wife father 
' ' brother and a few other kith and kin and did 
not include any of Saharul's kith or kin. 
Assuming the possibility that Saharul can 
be discounted but Ameer-ul Islam can be listed 
as a suspect, the police then physically 
conducted a raid at the temporary home of 
Ameer-ul Islam nearby the crime spot and found 
that he had left home a few hours after the 
crime had happened and that he did not leave 
behind any kind of biological traces at his 
temporary home to obtain his DNA 
information. Thus, at that stage, Ameer-ul 
Islam had remained a potential suspect-at-large 
with absolutely no helpful evidence to confirm 
his involvement in the crime. Yet , the police 
proceeded with their plan to trace, locate, and 
then interrogate him. 
More confirming cyber facts emerged while 
interrogating the friends and relatives staying 
with Ameer-ul Islam. The police learned that he 
was seen engaged in an argumentative telephone 
call with his wife after which he had broken his 
mobile handset by throwing it against the wall 
sometime just past midnight on 27th April 2016 
(which was about 40 hours before the crime had 
happened). It was further revealed that Ameer-
ul Islam was away from home during the 
subsequent 2 days (including the day on which 
the crime had happened) but had returned 
home in the evening with a sudden plan to leave 
for his hometown, 2500 miles away (such a 
sudden, non-preplanned trip home was 
uncommon in this well-knit, communally 
orthodox group of migrant labourers). In 
addition, one of his fellow residents ( who was 
his father's brother's son and also a migrant 
labourer) revealed to the police that he had 
handed over a new mobile handset to Ameer-ul 
Islam as a gift to be handed over to his mother 
in his hometown near Dumdumiya in Assam, 
and that he had later heard from his mother 
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that Ameer-ul Islam had indeed promptly 
delivered it to her. All these crucial pieces of 
information (including the IMEI of the gifted 
handset) and also the pieces of related 
information subsequently collected from the 
home town of Ameer-ul Islam ( with the help of 
the Assam Police) were actually corroborating 
with the predictions of the cyber police officer. 
However, unlike he assumed, the absence of 
mobile phone evidence was not due to the 
perpetrator's intentional attempt to disassociate 
his phone from the crime but was because his 
mobile handset was actually dysfunctional since 
1:05 AM, 40 hours before the crime had 
happened. 
Anyway, with the motivation gained by the 
perfect corroboration of his cyber-predictions, 
the police officer proceeded further to put the 
mobile numbers of Ameer-ul Islam and his 
nearest kith and kin under surveillance and then 
waited for Ameer-ul Islam to further call them 
either using his original SIM card ( after loading 
it in a new mobile handset) or using another 
SIM card in a new handset. Also, at regular 
intervals, the officer kept on sending text 
messages to the mobile number of Ameer-ul 
Islam with the hope that at least one of these 
messages will be delivered as and when his SIM 
card became functional and that the metadata 
of such a delivery can remain evidential to 
locate him. Just as the officer expected, on 6th 
June 2016, the 40th day of the crime, a message 
sent to his mobile was found promptly delivered 
onto his mobile which was an indication to the 
police that the original SIM card of Ameer-ul 
Islam had become once again active after a gap 
of 40 days. From the IMEI code contained in 
the meta-details of the delivery of this message, 
the police noted that he was using a new mobile 
handset. Moreover, the tower location in the 
meta-details suggested that he was then at 
Kanchipuram which is a place in the south-
eastern Indian state of Tamilnadu, about 2000 
miles south of his home town and about 400 
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miles east of the crime spot. This telecom 
information was decisive for the investigating 
team and they soon sent their field squad to 
Kanchipuuram with a plan to conduct a 
combing operation there to locate him. But , by 
the time the team reached Kanchipuram, the 
original SIM card of Ameer-ul Islam was once 
again found non-functional as there were no 
specific traces of his further movements. 
In addition to this decisive, crucial 
information, the police cyber expert soon noted 
that Ameer-ul Islam's kith and kin had already 
started receiving calls from Kanchipuram from 
a new SIM card. This new SIM card was then 
traced to its owner, Udayakumar, who, 
ironically, was found totally unrelated to 
Ameer-ul Islam's family members. However, 
upon interrogation, Udayakumar revealed to 
the police field squad that , through his friend, 
he had recently sold his SIM card illegally to 
Ameer-ul Islam. With his and his friend's help, 
the police soon successfully located Ameer-ul 
Islam in Kanchipuram and took him into 
custody on the 59th day of the crime incident. 
They then forcibly took his blood sample 
and sent it for DNA matching. A successful 
cross-match of his DNA (with the DNA 
obtained from the bloodstains found on the dead 
body and also on the cloths nearby) proved 
(RGSB, 2016) that he was present at the crime 
spot and had shed blood there and so could have 
had a part in the crime. 
This confirmation marked the end of the 
successful searching of the police cyber expert 
along the cyber space for the person carrying 
the particular DNA. 
Later, the trial court finally found him 
guilty of both rape and murder and awarded 
him the capital punishment of death sentence, 
subject to the confirmation of the High Court of 
Kerala (Judgment, 2017). 
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4. REASONS FOR 
REPORTING THIS CASE 
Such a successful, scientific, and non-
conventional investigation by the Kerala Police 
using cyber forensics in order to locate, trace, 
and eventually convict such a perpetrator 
deserves international attention, for various 
reasons. 
Firstly, this case was a traditional rape and 
murder with no human witness and also with no 
helpful clues found in the CDR of the victim's 
mobile number. There were no clues in the ±2-
hour tower dump generated during the crime 
either. Generally, absence of telephone evidence 
in such cases persuades the police not to pursue 
the telecom call lists any more. But, in this case, 
by assuming that apparent lack of telephone 
evidence may not really be a lack of evidence, 
the police officer had expanded his investigation 
by collecting more telecom records generated 
days before and after the crime had happened 
and apparently derived intelligent facts from it, 
innovatively. 
Secondly, the temporarily inactive SIM card 
found belonged to one among the hundred 
thousand generally active SIM cards found in 
the thickly populated area around the crime 
scene where the SIM card density was more 
than 100% of the population. Identifying such 
an active SIM card with such an hours-long 
inactivity history from a gigantic 8.4 million call 
records demanded absolute cyber forensic 
brilliance, supreme cleverness and sheer 
dedicated persistence from the part of the police 
officer who was equipped only with a laptop and 
Microsoft Excel. He approached and carried out 
his task by using the various innovative 
alternatives in a systematic manner. His 
successful identification of this SIM card turned 
out to be a crucial milestone in the success of 
the investigation of this crime, and undoubtedly 
provides an interesting precedent in clever 
forensic procedure. 
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Thirdly, in a densely populated country 
(with population close to 1.3 billion, more than 
four times that of the US and the second largest 
in the world) and with an area close to only 1.3 
million square miles ( only slightly more than 
one-third of that of the US), and with an ethno-
cultural, linguistic, and communicative 
diversity more than found in any nation in the 
world (Census, 2011), tracing the movement of 
this already identified SIM card also demanded 
absolute cyber inventiveness and innovation on 
the part of this police officer especially when the 
SIM user, a migrant labourer, had changed his 
handset twice and this SIM card once, and had 
travelled almost 4500 miles during the following 
40 days of the crime with an absolute minimal 
use of his SIM card. 
Cyber investigation experts and related 
researchers worldwide are expected to be made 
aware of such possible non-conventional 
approaches to intelligently handle such difficult 
and unfavorable forensic situations. 
5. CONCLUSION 
To sum up, modern crime investigation depends 
heavily on digital evidence which is something 
that is automatically created during use or 
abuse of digital equipment while conducting 
crimes. Digital evidence, if properly backed by 
scientific methods, often helps investigation 
agencies to unequivocally establish not just 
abuses of digital equipment but also solve 
various other traditional crimes in which digital 
equipment is involved. Not only presence of the 
information generated by such digital gadgets 
but also the absence of the mandatory 
information generated by such digital gadgets 
can remain evidential If analyzed cleverly and 
inferred brilliantly, the apparent absence need 
not be an unhelpful negative forensic 
phenomenon, but can lead on to positive 
evidential clues, as revealed by the live, actual 
and rare cyber forensic instance, mentioned 
above. 
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